of Francesco Martone
22 / 12 / 2010
Failure announced, Copenhagen II, a step in the right direction, a lifeboat adrift for multilateralism. Never before this time groped to provide a unique assessment of the outcome of the Cancun Conference appears to be complex exercise, given the different tracks of analysis possible. That the result could be low-profile that was now certain. It was enough to read the "text of President "of the Working Group on Cooperation in broad term (dedicated to define the lines of work on the issues of adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, finance) to note that in the plethora of verbs used to define the final decisions, there were few verbs that define some kind of commitment. Among these ones - then confirmed in Cancun - definitely to launch a comprehensive program for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD - Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation), a green background to the climate, a center for technology transfer , an institutional framework to manage the adjustment programs. The rest was given to what engineers call "Rolling process" an ongoing process in which you decide not to decide, and to replace certain commitments, the option to keep open channels of negotiation. The Mexican presidency had in fact opted for an alternative strategy to that implemented until then. Rather than thinking you can approve a comprehensive package of commitments and actions, it was decided to work on so-called "building blocks". A game in which the Lego brick by brick we reconstruct the negotiations and called themselves piecemeal policy commitments and spending. Starting from the base, the bricks on which it was recorded in Copenhagen already a sort of consensus. Tip
diplomatic and delicate balancing acts have so characterized the management of the conference by the Presidency of Mexico. Already in Tianjin, the "vulgate" official pointed to a possible failure of Cancun in the coup de grace to a multilateral process already strained in Copenhagen, thanks to the nefarious management of the Danish Presidency and the coup carried out by Barack Obama and others countries that imposed a non-binding agreement in fact contradicts the most elementary rules of consent. Then the Copenhagen Accord was "noticed" by the Conference of the Parties, it is not the official text of the negotiation, nor shared by some countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador. Then it seemed ALBA could be an important new player in global negotiations. Today, the final count of the post-Cancun, Bolivia is more isolated than ever. Ambassador Pablo Solon - with a few demonstration in support of fact made by the traditional allies (Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador) - has been left alone, like a David against Goliath, to reiterate the inadequacy of the final agreement, possible accomplice " genocide and ecocide "(as in his words). Today, the "Agreements of Cancun" ("Cancun Agreements") are accepted by all, to a greater or lesser extent, as a lowest common denominator needed to keep open the multilateral negotiation to the next Conference of Parties to Durban 2011.
What will be the scenario in the coming months is difficult to predict, but surely you can already guess who will be the issues on which negotiations will focus. First of all on the support of the second period 's implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol severely tested in the crossfire of Canada, Japan, the United States, and finally from Russia who had just announced his decision in Cancun not to sign the second commitment period. Reflecting the unexpected opening of India and China are prepared to accept commitments to reduce emissions, in exchange for support for the Kyoto Protocol has helped to reshape the balance of power negotiating, giving the group BASIC (Brasile, Cina, Sudafrica e India) un ruolo propulsore, e lasciando gli Stati Uniti all’angolo, stretti tra il rilancio di Cina ed India ed un Congresso a maggioranza repubblicana che non permette strappi in avanti. Se una similitudine si può trovare con il negoziato di Cancun 2003 all’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio forse è proprio quella relativa al rafforzamento del ruolo dei paesi BASIC che allora diedero il colpo di grazia al Doha Round ed ora invece una boccata d’ossigeno alla Conferenza sui Mutamenti Climatici. Il Protocollo di Kyoto resta così in piedi, ma duramente provato: basti leggere le parti relative agli impegni di riduzione delle emissioni accettate a Cancun per capirne il destino.
In un gioco d’incastri between the various documents needed to maintain a balance between the needs of developing countries and industrialized countries, has in fact confirmed the contents of the Agreement of Copenhagen. Stabilization of the growth temperature to 2 degrees above pre-industrial (which many believe still lethal, for example for small island states) but subject to revision in 2015 with a view to a possible reduction to 1.5 degrees. Some observers have taken this decision with satisfaction for the first time since the limit of 2 degrees would be included in an international agreement. Instead of the so-called MRV (Monitoring Reporting and Verification) the real irritant in the negotiations in recent months, has been replaced a verification system "light", "non-intrusive" and "respectful of the sovereignty." In Cancun it was then finally fixed 1990 as the base year for calculating the level of emissions reductions, even if it leaves wide discretion for countries to decide on a different date. The real key to the problem of the relationship between reduction commitments and national mitigation plans, which - according to countries' s industrialization - are likely to be prohibitively expensive in relation to their growth prospects.
Then the first node that the negotiations will have to dissolve to Durban this is what still holds the fate of the Kyoto Protocol plans mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol and on the "legal form" of the new binding agreement, the game is still open. It was extended by one year the mandate of the working group, with the goal of continuing to discuss the instrument to be adopted, namely whether to propose a new protocol, or a 'Appendix to the old. Or, if you follow the system - in fact entitled to Cancun - the so-called "pledge and review" proposed by the U.S. and the Copenhagen Agreement which is soaked: we are committed on paper to reduce emissions and from time to time do and verification of case. No penalty, no clear commitment. Under these conditions, the protocol would remain standing yes, but as an "imago sine King ", an image without substance. On the issue of funding for programs on climate, was finally launched the Green Fund for Climate, whose structure will be defined by an ad hoc working group within the Durban Conference. This fund will be under the authority of the Conference of the Parties, but for the first three years given to the World Bank that will act as trustee.
A blow to a circle of the barrel for those who wanted the central player of the World Bank funding for the climate and those who wanted it out. Too bad that you forget not indifferent to two details: first that the World Bank is the institution most involved in the development of public support ai combustibili fossili ed il secondo che il suo ruolo come amministratore fiduciario è risultato essere discutibile e di scarsa efficacia come attestato da alcune valutazioni interne in corso. E di quanti soldi stiamo parlando?
A Cancun si riafferma l’impegno a stanziare 30 miliardi di dollari l’anno fino al 2012 e da allora in poi 100 miliardi di dollari, ma dove andare a trovare queste somme è ancora poco chiaro. Da una parte va rilevato che non si è adottato alcun impegno sul sostegno a meccanismi di mercato per il finanziamento dei programmi di mitigazione, né per la costruzione di un mercato mondiale di permessi di emissione, anche se viene ribadita la centralità dei meccanismi di flessibilità previsti da Kyoto. Dall’altra però nulla è stato deciso sugli impegni di spesa relativi a fondi pubblici , nuovi ed addizionali, e non riciclati dalla cooperazione allo sviluppo, che devono invece essere la principale fonte di sostegno ai programmi di adattamento e mitigazione. Il rapporto stilato dal gruppo di lavoro ad hoc costituito da Ban Ki Mun identifica poi alcune ipotesi quali una carbon tax globale, o addirittura una possibile tassazione sulle transazioni finanziarie che però non ha avuto grande eco nel negoziato. Certo è che da Cancun parte un segnale chiaro verso il settore privato, che può vedere nella “green economy” e nella transizione verso un’economia a basso contenuto di carbonio un’importante opportunità.
A leggere il documento Final Cancun is clear that the whole issue of climate change remains firmly anchored to a paradigm of economic development and continues to see economic growth ("high growth"), the major parameter of reference. This is perhaps the single biggest limitation of the negotiations: that of not envisage a real change of direction, a new model that can bring together environment, understood as environmental justice, and economics understood as the progressive disengagement from the myth of growth. On this work to be done is still a lot especially to create and strengthen the political demand from "below" that can contribute to diminish the misplaced confidence in the market model and growth. Leave all the fate of the planet exclusively to international negotiations between states is likely to justify a race to the downside, if these negotiations are the only two driving forces behind the national interests of states, or those of positioning in global governance, opportunism of companies. Because if
from Cancun, it was decided to keep alive the multilateral process, hours will be worth the trouble to ask what they are talking about multilateralism, as the role of civil society movements, municipalities, the non-state actors other than States shall was severely eroded. Who was in Cancun has not been observed to be very difficult to influence and follow the negotiations, quasi tutte a porte chiuse, ed anche prendere atto della frammentazione dei movimenti, riuniti in ben 4 coordinamenti ed iniziative differenti che ne hanno certamente diluito la capacità di incidenza politica.
Al di là delle questioni specifiche relative al clima ed al modello energetico, che oggi più di prima devono essere affrontate soprattutto a livello nazionale e locale, Cancun ci lascia quindi un messaggio chiaro riguardo all’urgenza di costruire nuove alleanze, tra movimenti sociali, ed ambientali, piccole e medie imprese dedicate alle energie rinnovabili ed al risparmio energetico, comunità che già applicano metodi di adattamento e mitigazione dei mutamenti climatici, organizzazioni indigene e contadine, amministrazioni locali "Virtuous" unions.
Without this convergence of political actors, the way to Durban is likely to remain a path between states, then guided exclusively by the urgency of reconciling a general national interest with the categorical imperative of economic growth. And as difficult as it will be difficult to derive a sharp reversal of direction.
22 / 12 / 2010
Failure announced, Copenhagen II, a step in the right direction, a lifeboat adrift for multilateralism. Never before this time groped to provide a unique assessment of the outcome of the Cancun Conference appears to be complex exercise, given the different tracks of analysis possible. That the result could be low-profile that was now certain. It was enough to read the "text of President "of the Working Group on Cooperation in broad term (dedicated to define the lines of work on the issues of adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, finance) to note that in the plethora of verbs used to define the final decisions, there were few verbs that define some kind of commitment. Among these ones - then confirmed in Cancun - definitely to launch a comprehensive program for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD - Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation), a green background to the climate, a center for technology transfer , an institutional framework to manage the adjustment programs. The rest was given to what engineers call "Rolling process" an ongoing process in which you decide not to decide, and to replace certain commitments, the option to keep open channels of negotiation. The Mexican presidency had in fact opted for an alternative strategy to that implemented until then. Rather than thinking you can approve a comprehensive package of commitments and actions, it was decided to work on so-called "building blocks". A game in which the Lego brick by brick we reconstruct the negotiations and called themselves piecemeal policy commitments and spending. Starting from the base, the bricks on which it was recorded in Copenhagen already a sort of consensus. Tip
diplomatic and delicate balancing acts have so characterized the management of the conference by the Presidency of Mexico. Already in Tianjin, the "vulgate" official pointed to a possible failure of Cancun in the coup de grace to a multilateral process already strained in Copenhagen, thanks to the nefarious management of the Danish Presidency and the coup carried out by Barack Obama and others countries that imposed a non-binding agreement in fact contradicts the most elementary rules of consent. Then the Copenhagen Accord was "noticed" by the Conference of the Parties, it is not the official text of the negotiation, nor shared by some countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador. Then it seemed ALBA could be an important new player in global negotiations. Today, the final count of the post-Cancun, Bolivia is more isolated than ever. Ambassador Pablo Solon - with a few demonstration in support of fact made by the traditional allies (Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador) - has been left alone, like a David against Goliath, to reiterate the inadequacy of the final agreement, possible accomplice " genocide and ecocide "(as in his words). Today, the "Agreements of Cancun" ("Cancun Agreements") are accepted by all, to a greater or lesser extent, as a lowest common denominator needed to keep open the multilateral negotiation to the next Conference of Parties to Durban 2011.
What will be the scenario in the coming months is difficult to predict, but surely you can already guess who will be the issues on which negotiations will focus. First of all on the support of the second period 's implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol severely tested in the crossfire of Canada, Japan, the United States, and finally from Russia who had just announced his decision in Cancun not to sign the second commitment period. Reflecting the unexpected opening of India and China are prepared to accept commitments to reduce emissions, in exchange for support for the Kyoto Protocol has helped to reshape the balance of power negotiating, giving the group BASIC (Brasile, Cina, Sudafrica e India) un ruolo propulsore, e lasciando gli Stati Uniti all’angolo, stretti tra il rilancio di Cina ed India ed un Congresso a maggioranza repubblicana che non permette strappi in avanti. Se una similitudine si può trovare con il negoziato di Cancun 2003 all’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio forse è proprio quella relativa al rafforzamento del ruolo dei paesi BASIC che allora diedero il colpo di grazia al Doha Round ed ora invece una boccata d’ossigeno alla Conferenza sui Mutamenti Climatici. Il Protocollo di Kyoto resta così in piedi, ma duramente provato: basti leggere le parti relative agli impegni di riduzione delle emissioni accettate a Cancun per capirne il destino.
In un gioco d’incastri between the various documents needed to maintain a balance between the needs of developing countries and industrialized countries, has in fact confirmed the contents of the Agreement of Copenhagen. Stabilization of the growth temperature to 2 degrees above pre-industrial (which many believe still lethal, for example for small island states) but subject to revision in 2015 with a view to a possible reduction to 1.5 degrees. Some observers have taken this decision with satisfaction for the first time since the limit of 2 degrees would be included in an international agreement. Instead of the so-called MRV (Monitoring Reporting and Verification) the real irritant in the negotiations in recent months, has been replaced a verification system "light", "non-intrusive" and "respectful of the sovereignty." In Cancun it was then finally fixed 1990 as the base year for calculating the level of emissions reductions, even if it leaves wide discretion for countries to decide on a different date. The real key to the problem of the relationship between reduction commitments and national mitigation plans, which - according to countries' s industrialization - are likely to be prohibitively expensive in relation to their growth prospects.
Then the first node that the negotiations will have to dissolve to Durban this is what still holds the fate of the Kyoto Protocol plans mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol and on the "legal form" of the new binding agreement, the game is still open. It was extended by one year the mandate of the working group, with the goal of continuing to discuss the instrument to be adopted, namely whether to propose a new protocol, or a 'Appendix to the old. Or, if you follow the system - in fact entitled to Cancun - the so-called "pledge and review" proposed by the U.S. and the Copenhagen Agreement which is soaked: we are committed on paper to reduce emissions and from time to time do and verification of case. No penalty, no clear commitment. Under these conditions, the protocol would remain standing yes, but as an "imago sine King ", an image without substance. On the issue of funding for programs on climate, was finally launched the Green Fund for Climate, whose structure will be defined by an ad hoc working group within the Durban Conference. This fund will be under the authority of the Conference of the Parties, but for the first three years given to the World Bank that will act as trustee.
A blow to a circle of the barrel for those who wanted the central player of the World Bank funding for the climate and those who wanted it out. Too bad that you forget not indifferent to two details: first that the World Bank is the institution most involved in the development of public support ai combustibili fossili ed il secondo che il suo ruolo come amministratore fiduciario è risultato essere discutibile e di scarsa efficacia come attestato da alcune valutazioni interne in corso. E di quanti soldi stiamo parlando?
A Cancun si riafferma l’impegno a stanziare 30 miliardi di dollari l’anno fino al 2012 e da allora in poi 100 miliardi di dollari, ma dove andare a trovare queste somme è ancora poco chiaro. Da una parte va rilevato che non si è adottato alcun impegno sul sostegno a meccanismi di mercato per il finanziamento dei programmi di mitigazione, né per la costruzione di un mercato mondiale di permessi di emissione, anche se viene ribadita la centralità dei meccanismi di flessibilità previsti da Kyoto. Dall’altra però nulla è stato deciso sugli impegni di spesa relativi a fondi pubblici , nuovi ed addizionali, e non riciclati dalla cooperazione allo sviluppo, che devono invece essere la principale fonte di sostegno ai programmi di adattamento e mitigazione. Il rapporto stilato dal gruppo di lavoro ad hoc costituito da Ban Ki Mun identifica poi alcune ipotesi quali una carbon tax globale, o addirittura una possibile tassazione sulle transazioni finanziarie che però non ha avuto grande eco nel negoziato. Certo è che da Cancun parte un segnale chiaro verso il settore privato, che può vedere nella “green economy” e nella transizione verso un’economia a basso contenuto di carbonio un’importante opportunità.
A leggere il documento Final Cancun is clear that the whole issue of climate change remains firmly anchored to a paradigm of economic development and continues to see economic growth ("high growth"), the major parameter of reference. This is perhaps the single biggest limitation of the negotiations: that of not envisage a real change of direction, a new model that can bring together environment, understood as environmental justice, and economics understood as the progressive disengagement from the myth of growth. On this work to be done is still a lot especially to create and strengthen the political demand from "below" that can contribute to diminish the misplaced confidence in the market model and growth. Leave all the fate of the planet exclusively to international negotiations between states is likely to justify a race to the downside, if these negotiations are the only two driving forces behind the national interests of states, or those of positioning in global governance, opportunism of companies. Because if
from Cancun, it was decided to keep alive the multilateral process, hours will be worth the trouble to ask what they are talking about multilateralism, as the role of civil society movements, municipalities, the non-state actors other than States shall was severely eroded. Who was in Cancun has not been observed to be very difficult to influence and follow the negotiations, quasi tutte a porte chiuse, ed anche prendere atto della frammentazione dei movimenti, riuniti in ben 4 coordinamenti ed iniziative differenti che ne hanno certamente diluito la capacità di incidenza politica.
Al di là delle questioni specifiche relative al clima ed al modello energetico, che oggi più di prima devono essere affrontate soprattutto a livello nazionale e locale, Cancun ci lascia quindi un messaggio chiaro riguardo all’urgenza di costruire nuove alleanze, tra movimenti sociali, ed ambientali, piccole e medie imprese dedicate alle energie rinnovabili ed al risparmio energetico, comunità che già applicano metodi di adattamento e mitigazione dei mutamenti climatici, organizzazioni indigene e contadine, amministrazioni locali "Virtuous" unions.
Without this convergence of political actors, the way to Durban is likely to remain a path between states, then guided exclusively by the urgency of reconciling a general national interest with the categorical imperative of economic growth. And as difficult as it will be difficult to derive a sharp reversal of direction.
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